Authorizing Third-Party Applications Served through Messaging Platforms by Sancho Larraz, Jorge et al.




Authorizing third-party applications served through messaging 2 
platforms 3 
Jorge Sancho 1,*, José García 1 and Álvaro Alesanco 1 4 
1 Aragón Institute of Engineering Research (I3A), University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza 50009 Spain 5 
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. 6 
Abstract: The widespread adoption of smartphones and the new-generation wireless networks have 7 
changed the way that people interact among themselves and with their environment. The use of 8 
messaging platforms, such as WhatsApp, has become deeply ingrained in peoples’ lives, and many 9 
digital services have started to be delivered using these communication channels. In this work we 10 
propose a new OAuth grant type to be used when the interaction between the resource owner and 11 
the client takes place through a messaging platform. This new grant type firstly allows the authori- 12 
zation server to be sure that no Man-in-the-Middle risk exists between the resource owner and the 13 
client before issuing an access token. Secondly, it allows the authorization server to interact with the 14 
resource owner through the same user-agent already being used to interact with the client, i.e. the 15 
messaging platform, which is expected to improve the overall user experience of the authorization 16 
process. To verify this assumption, we have conducted a usability study in which subjects have been 17 
required to perform the full authorization process using both the standard authorization code grant 18 
type (through a web-browser) and the new grant type defined in this work. They have also been 19 
required to fill in a small questionnaire including some demographic information and their impres- 20 
sions about both authorization flows. The results suggest that the proposed grant type eases the 21 
authorization process in most cases.   22 
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 24 
1. Introduction 25 
The way users interact among themselves and with their environment is constantly 26 
changing, and the delivery of digital services continuously evolves to keep pace with these 27 
changes. The use of virtual assistants has recently revolutionized the service delivery par- 28 
adigm. These assistants interact with users through multiple interfaces (smart speakers, 29 
messaging platforms, etc.) providing different kinds of services ranging from simple in- 30 
formation enquiries (e.g. the forecast or the air pollution) to more complex operations, 31 
such as route optimization or patient follow-up management [1]. As occurred with tradi- 32 
tional web applications, virtual assistants might eventually need access to some private 33 
information held by a third-party service provider (e.g. the real-time traffic state infor- 34 
mation) to perform some operations on the user’s behalf. Service providers will require 35 
users to authenticate themselves and authorize the virtual assistant to access their remote 36 
accounts [2-4]. 37 
Access to this information is usually provided through Web Application Programing 38 
Interfaces (Web-APIs) designed for this purpose [5] while transactions with these kinds 39 
of API rely on Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) for message exchange. Security of 40 
Web-APIs usually relies on the Open Authorization (OAuth) 2.0 framework [6-7]. This 41 
framework defines a scenario composed of four actors: the end-user, the resource server, 42 
the client and the authorization server. In this scenario the end-user asks the client to per- 43 
form some operation on his behalf, so that the client requires access to some user’s pro- 44 




authorization server arbitrates the access to the protected resource ensuring that the end- 46 
user has sufficient rights to access the requested resource and that the client has been au- 47 
thorized to act on the end-user’s behalf. In this context, OAuth includes all the required 48 
elements to empower the end-user, allowing him to authorize the client to act on his be- 49 
half, without having to show his credentials. Among other things, it defines a protocol 50 
(grant type) that allows the authorization server to directly interact with the resource 51 
owner, thus verifying his identity and gathering his consent to let the client act on his 52 
behalf. This grant type was designed with a concrete type of client profile in mind, that is 53 
web-applications that are served by a web server and accessed by end-users using a web- 54 
browser as user-agent. Thus, this grant type was conveniently designed so that the inter- 55 
action between the resource owner and the authorization server could be performed 56 
through the same interface (user-agent) that the resource owner was already using to ac- 57 
cess the client, i.e. a web browser.  58 
When communication channels other than web-browsers are used for the interaction 59 
between the end-user and the client, such as messaging platforms, the underlying author- 60 
ization problem is essentially the same (providing the end-user with a reliable method to 61 
express his intention of authorizing the client to act on his behalf), but some considerations 62 
must be taken into account. These considerations include two aspects:  dealing with se- 63 
curity issues and usability aspects derived from changes in the scenario. The contributions 64 
of this paper are as follows: 65 
• We propose a new OAuth grant type to be used when the interaction between 66 
the client and the resource owner is done through a messaging platform. Unlike the stand- 67 
ard OAuth authorization code grant type, it allows the authorization server to ensure that 68 
no Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) risk exists between the resource owner and the client before 69 
issuing the access token, so that no user’s private information is exposed to a potential 70 
attacker. This new grant type has been designed to allow the authorization server to in- 71 
teract with the resource owner using the same communication that he was already using 72 
with the client, the messaging platform.  73 
• We have conducted a usability test to verify that gathering the user consent 74 
using the proposed grant type results in a better overall user experience of the authoriza- 75 
tion process. 76 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the access 77 
control background. Section 3 shows the proposed grant type. Section 4 presents a security 78 
analysis while Section 5 describes the usability study. Section 6 discusses the results ob- 79 
tained. Finally, the conclusions and future work can be found in Section 7. 80 
2. Background 81 
2.1. OAuth 2.0 framework 82 
OAuth 2.0 is currently the standard framework for authorization. It defines a base 83 
scenario composed of four actors: the end-user, the resource server, the client and the au- 84 
thorization server. The end-user is an entity capable of granting access to a protected re- 85 
source that is stored in the resource server. The client is an application that requires access 86 
to the protected resource to perform some action on behalf of the end-user and with his 87 
consent, while the authorization server arbitrates the access to the protected resource by 88 
means of two endpoints: the authorize endpoint and the token endpoint. When the client 89 
requires access (on behalf of the end-user) to the protected resource, it sends an authori- 90 
zation request (A) to the authorize endpoint, so that the authorization server can directly 91 
interact with the end-user, authenticating him and gathering his consent to authorize the 92 
client to act on his behalf. If the end-user authorizes the client to act on his behalf, the 93 
authorization server sends an authorization code in the authorization response to the cli- 94 
ent (B). The client exchanges the code obtained for an access token at the token endpoint 95 
of the authorization server, sending the code in the token request (C) and receiving the 96 
access token in the body of the token response (D). Requests to the token endpoint must 97 
include the client credentials whenever client authentication is required. Finally, the client 98 
 
 
can use the obtained access token to access the protected resource at the resource server. 99 
The standard defines a protocol based on HTTP redirections (see Fig. 1) so that the au- 100 
thorization server can directly interact with the end-user. In this flow, information is 101 
passed from the client to the authorization server encoded as query parameters in the URL 102 
when redirecting the end-user. 103 
 104 
Figure 1. OAuth 2.0 Authorization code grant type. 105 
2.2. TextSecure security 106 
Most messaging platforms, such as Signal, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger or 107 
Skype, rely on the TextSecure protocol [8] to provide security to users’ conversations. This 108 
protocol provides end-to-end encryption between communication peers, so that no eaves- 109 
dropper is able to see the content of exchanged messages. To that end, it relies on a public 110 
key scheme where each user-agent (i.e. application installed in the user’s device) generates 111 
its own key pair (public and private keys) at the time of installation. This key pair is fur- 112 
ther used to generate session keys that are used to encrypt the conversation.  113 
However, there is no way for a party to be sure a priori that a given public key be- 114 
longs to his communication peer. A MitM attacker would be able to modify messages 115 
exchanged at the start of a conversation, tricking parties into believing that his own public 116 
key (the attacker one) belongs to the other communication peer, developing the attack. 117 
This is addressed by the so-called authentication ceremony, which consist in comparing 118 
parties’ public keys using an out-of-band channel, thus preventing this risk. In current 119 
messaging platforms it can be done by comparing a safety number (which is really a con- 120 
catenation of both users’ public key fingerprint) or scanning a QR code. 121 
2.3. Problem definition 122 
In this work we will focus on a scenario (see Fig. 2) in which an end-user is using a 123 
messaging platform to access a remote service provided by the client. The end-user re- 124 
quires to authorize (in an OAuth sense) the client to access on his behalf some protected 125 




Figure 2. Reference scenario. End-user authorizes the client to access his resources at the resource 128 
server on his behalf. 129 
Currently, if the client needs to access a resource stored at the resource server, and 130 
this access has been secured using the OAuth framework, the client’s best attempt to ob- 131 
tain the user consent consists in sending a link to the user as a normal message in the 132 
conversation pointing to the authorize endpoint of the authorization server with the re- 133 
quired parameters (the same URL to which the user would be redirected if the communi- 134 
cation between the user and client were through a web-browser). The user must follow 135 
this link and continue the interaction through the web-browser to authorize the client to 136 
access his protected resource. Once the client obtains the required access token, the client 137 
will again interact with the user through the messaging platform, so that he must return 138 
from the web-browser to this platform. Switching from the messaging platform to the 139 
web-browser and back may hamper the usability of the system, making users reluctant to 140 
use new communication channels to consume services.  141 
Given the construction of the TextSecure protocol, a MitM attacker could be placed 142 
between the user and the client, inevitably seeing all the private information being ex- 143 
changed between both. Even worse, this attacker would be able to modify the link sent by 144 
the client (to start the authorization process), so that it will point to a fake website owned 145 
by the attacker pretending to be the authorization server. In such a situation the attacker 146 
would be able to trick the user into introducing his private credentials at the fake site, 147 
making them available to the attacker. This MitM threat could be simply prevented by the 148 
authentication ceremony (as stated in Section 2.2). However, users must complete the au- 149 
thentication ceremony with every single client they want to interact with, which would 150 
hamper the user-experience. Studies point out that most users do not complete the au- 151 
thentication ceremony even to exchange sensitive information such as credit cards num- 152 
bers [9-11], and the worst part is that the authorization server, which is the custodian of 153 
the users’ data privacy, has no way of ensuring that the authentication ceremony has been 154 
completed between them before issuing an access token. 155 
3. Proposed authorization protocol 156 
In this section, we detail the proposed grant type (see Fig. 3). It has been designed to 157 
be used with client profiles that use messaging platforms as user-agents to deliver ser- 158 
vices. In this new grant type, the authorization server is able to interact with the end-user 159 
using the same interface (user-agent) that he is already using to interact with the client, 160 
 
 
i.e. the messaging platform. Messaging platforms do not support any kind of redirection 161 
mechanism, which is crucial in the Authorization Code grant type defined by the OAuth 162 
standard. These redirections have a double function; to allow the client to pass the re- 163 
quired information to the authorization server (and the other way) and to allow the au- 164 
thorization server to directly interact with the end-user (to ask them for their consent). As 165 
can be seen in Figure 3, our protocol substitutes those redirections with direct HTTP com- 166 
munication between the client and the authorization server (to pass the required infor- 167 
mation), while the direct communication between the authorization server and the end- 168 
user is enabled thanks to the inclusion of two new parameters (platform and id) at the 169 
authorization request as it is explained below.   170 
 171 
Figure 3. Proposed grant type to authorize third-party applications served through messaging 172 
platforms. Blue arrows represent HTTP messages while orange arrows represent communications 173 
through the messaging platform.  174 
The proposed protocol also integrates the security related aspects as a part of the 175 
protocol. The authorization server is also allowed to complete the authorization process 176 
securely without relying on the authentication ceremony between the user and the client. 177 
It is also able to guarantee that no MitM risk exists before letting the client obtain any 178 
private information. 179 
3.1. Prerequisites 180 
Since the resource owner will interact with the authorization server using a messag- 181 
ing platform, some prerequisites are needed before the proposed grant type can be used. 182 
There are two main prerequisites: obtaining the user identifier (id) on a specific platform 183 
and completing the authentication ceremony on this platform (as shown in Section 2.2). 184 
This must be done using an out-of-band channel and would typically be performed at the 185 
time the user registers himself at the authorization server using its web interface. Note 186 
that an authorization server may support several messaging platforms. In that case, the 187 
user would firstly be asked to select which platform is going to be registered. On the other 188 
hand, the same user may register himself on several platforms. 189 
Most messaging platforms currently support two ways of completing the authenti- 190 
cation ceremony, by comparing a safety number or by scanning a QR code. We present 191 
three different ways of doing this. The first way is asking the user to manually write the 192 
safety number in a text box. The second way, which is appropriate when the registration 193 
is being done from a different device from that where the messaging application is 194 
 
 
installed (i.e. a laptop), is asking the user to show the pairing QR code to the webcam of 195 
the device where the registration is taking place. The third way, which is appropriate 196 
when the registration is being done from the same device that has the messaging applica- 197 
tion installed (i.e. a smartphone), is asking the user to take a snapshot of the pairing QR 198 
code and upload it to the authorization server. 199 
3.2. Authorization request 200 
When the client application requires access to a protected resource, it sends a request 201 
to the authorize endpoint of the authorization server, including the following parameters 202 
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format with a character encoding of 203 
UTF-8 in the HTTP request entity-body: 204 
 205 
    platform 206 
        REQUIRED. The concrete messaging platform the user is interacting   207 
        with (e.g. WhatsApp, Signal). 208 
 209 
    id 210 
        REQUIRED. The user identifier in the messaging platform (e.g. phone  211 
        number). 212 
 213 
    key_fingerprint 214 
        REQUIRED. Fingerprint of the long-term identity public key. 215 
 216 
    client_id 217 
        REQUIRED. A string uniquely identifying the client. 218 
 219 
    redirect_uri 220 
        OPTIONAL. A URI to redirect the user back after the authorization. 221 
 222 
    scope 223 
        OPTIONAL. A string describing the access rights requested by the      224 
        client. 225 
 226 
    state 227 
        RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used by the client to maintain  228 
        state between the request and callback.   229 
 230 
Among these parameters, there are some defined in the standard (client_id, redi- 231 
rect_uri, scope and state) and others defined specifically for this grant type (platform, id and 232 
key_fingerprint). The platform parameter is used to determine which specific messaging 233 
platform the resource owner is using to interact with the client (e.g. WhatsApp, Signal) 234 
and the id is the identifier of the resource owner at this platform (e.g. the user’s phone 235 
number). These parameters are required to allow the authorization server to contact the 236 
resource owner since his identity is a priori unknown. The key_fingerprint is the fingerprint 237 
of what the client believes to be the end-user’s public key. It is included to allow the au- 238 
thorization server to ensure that no MitM attack between the client and the end-user is 239 
taking place before issuing the access token, even if the authentication ceremony between 240 
them has not been completed. 241 
3.3. Authorization request processing 242 
When the authorization server receives this request, it is validated ensuring that all 243 
the required parameters are present and valid. Then, the authorization server verifies that 244 
the received combination of platform and id has previously been registered for any user. If 245 
so, the key_fingerprint received from the client is verified to ensure that it is the same as 246 
that shown to the authorization server (the fingerprint of what is currently being shown 247 
to the authorization server as the end-user’s public key). They are also compared to be the 248 
same as that stored as a result of the authentication ceremony performed as explained in 249 
Section 3.1 (the fingerprint of the actual end-user’s public key). If everything goes as ex- 250 
pected, the authorization server acknowledges the received request sending a 200 OK 251 
 
 
response to the client. Otherwise, the authorization server quickly rejects the authoriza- 252 
tion sending a 400 Bad Requests message, including the error response parameters (error, 253 
error_description, error_uri and state) in the response body as defined in the standard. If the 254 
provided combination of id and platform has not been registered previously by any user, 255 
the error parameter is set to “access_denied”. If the public key fingerprint sent by the cli- 256 
ent does not match the one registered in the authorization server for that combination of 257 
id and platform, the authorization server returns the error parameter set as “pub- 258 
lic_key_not_match”. It can be used by the client to inform the resource owner about a 259 
possible MitM attack and abort the communication when considered necessary. 260 
At this point the authorization server can already contact the resource owner at the 261 
platform and id specified by the client. In this interaction, the authorization server may 262 
ask the user for some extra authentication information, like a one-time password (OTP) 263 
or some voice biometrics, or simply rely on the possession of the device where the mes- 264 
saging application is running (i.e. the possession of the complementary private key of the 265 
public key that was associated to a specific user during the authentication ceremony at 266 
the time of registration). Once the user identity has been verified, the authorization server 267 
evaluates the access control policies as it normally does (the specific policy evaluation 268 
method lies outside the scope of the OAuth standard). If everything goes as expected, the 269 
authorization server contacts the resource owner again to inform him the client applica- 270 
tion is requesting access to a resource on his behalf and asks him to authorize the client to 271 
complete this operation. 272 
3.4. Authorization response 273 
Once the authorization server has obtained the resource owner’s consent, it sends the 274 
authorization response to the client endpoint specified at the time of client registration or 275 
in the authorization request by the redirect_uri parameter. This response includes the fol- 276 
lowing parameters in the HTTP request entity-body using the "application/x-www-form- 277 
urlencoded" format with a character encoding of UTF-8. 278 
 279 
   code 280 
REQUIRED.  The authorization code generated by the authorization server. 281 
 282 
   state 283 
REQUIRED if the “state” parameter was included in the client authorization request. The exact 284 
value received from the client. 285 
 286 
If the resource owner’s consent cannot be obtained, the parameters included in the 287 
response are those defined in the error response (error, error_description, error_uri and state) 288 
setting the error parameter as “access_denied”. Independently of the result of the author- 289 
ization and the parameters included in the authorization response, the client acknowl- 290 
edges the reception of the authorization response sending a 200 OK response. 291 
3.5. Obtaining access token 292 
Finally, if the client has obtained a valid authorization code, it is exchanged for an 293 
access token in the token endpoint of the authorization server using the token request and 294 
token response defined in the standard, authenticating the client when required. Once the 295 
client application has obtained the access token, it can obtain the required resource from 296 
the resource server authorizing the operation with the access token. 297 
4. Security analysis 298 
In this section we analyze the security provided by the proposed authorization flow. 299 
First, we show how this method allows the authorization server to prevent the existence 300 
of a MitM between the end-user and any client, only requiring that the authentication 301 
ceremony between the end-user and the authorization server has previously been com- 302 
pleted. Secondly, we analyze the degree of security of the proposed method in the face of 303 
 
 
known attacks against OAuth. Other threat models (e.g. Denial of Service or eavesdrop- 304 
ping) have not been considered in this section as they are out of the scope of the manu- 305 
script. 306 
4.1. MitM attacker 307 
All the trust in the TextSecure protocol is based on asymmetric cryptography. Each 308 
participant generates its own key pair (a public key, 𝐾 , and a private key, 𝐾 ) that is 309 
used in the generation of all the subsequent cryptographic material required to encrypt 310 
and sign all messages exchanged during the conversation. Thus, a MitM attacker has to 311 
cheat both communication ends to make one communication end think that the attacker’s 312 
public key (𝐾 ) actually belongs to the other communication end [12]. In the scenario 313 
shown in Figure 4, the user has been cheated into thinking that the attacker’s public key 314 
(𝐾 ) really belongs to the client. In the same way, the client has been cheated into thinking 315 
that the attacker’s public key (𝐾 ) really belongs to the user. Finally, the user can be sure 316 
that what he believes to be the authorization server’s public key (𝐾 ) belongs to the au- 317 
thorization server and, in turn, the authorization server can be sure that what it believes 318 
to be the user’s public key (𝐾 ) really belongs to the user, thanks to having completed the 319 
authentication ceremony (which is a prerequisite of the proposed protocol).  320 
 321 
Figure 4. Man-in-the-Middle prevention showcase using the proposed grant type. 322 
In such a scenario, the MitM would be able to see and modify messages exchanged 323 
between the end-user and the client, while the authorization server has no way of detect- 324 
ing his presence if no additional measures are applied. The use of the key_fingerprint 325 
parameter in the authorization request of the proposed protocol is intended to sort out 326 
this situation. When the client starts the authorization process, the fingerprint of the at- 327 
tacker’s public key (𝐾 ) is included in the request, since the client has been cheated into 328 
thinking that this public key actually belongs to the end-user. When the authorization 329 
server receives the authorization request, it is able to compare the fingerprint of the re- 330 
ceived public key (𝐾 ) with the fingerprint of the public key that it has stored for the end- 331 
user (𝐾 ) as a result of the authentication ceremony. Any time that a MitM appears 332 
 
 
between the end-user and the client, the public key fingerprints will not match, and the 333 
authorization server would be able to detect its presence before issuing any access token. 334 
4.2. Security against known attacks 335 
In this section, we compare the security provided by the standard authorization code 336 
grant type through a web-browser as suggested in Section 2.3 (method A hereafter) with 337 
the new grant type proposed in Section 3 (method B hereafter). To that end, we analyze 338 
how attacks described in [13] affect these solutions or not, considering the 5 attacker mod- 339 
els defined in [13] and the MitM attacker presented previously (Section 4.1). We classify 340 
these attacks in three groups. The first group includes attacks that do not depend on the 341 
grant type flow but are related with other architectural aspects of the OAuth framework. 342 
These attacks include Access Token Leakage at the Resource Server, TLS Terminating Re- 343 
verse Proxies, Refresh Token Protection and Client Impersonating Resource Owner. At- 344 
tacks in this group affect both methods as they are independent of the specific grant type, 345 
and its countermeasures should always be applied. The second group includes those at- 346 
tacks that are exploited taking advantage of the HTTP redirection mechanism (used in the 347 
original OAuth Authorization Code grant type to move the user from the client to the 348 
authorization server and back) or any feature related with the web-browser (like the 349 
browser history). Thus, they would affect method A but would not affect method B, at 350 
least in its current form, as the proposed method does not rely on any HTTP redirection 351 
nor the use of a web-browser. This group includes Credential Leakage via Referer Head- 352 
ers, Credential Leakage via Browser History, Authorization Code Injection, Access Token 353 
Injection, Cross Site Request Forgery, Open Redirection and Clickjacking. Finally, attacks 354 
in the third group, which are the most interesting for us, affect both methods in different 355 
ways and are analyzed more carefully below. These attacks are Insufficient Redirect URI 356 
Validation and Mix-Up Attacks. Table 1 summarizes this information. 357 
Table 1. Exposure of methods A and B to attacks defined in [13]. Attacks in the first, second and 358 
third groups are written in yellow, green and red respectively. 359 
Attack vector A B 
4.1.  Insufficient Redirect URI Validation Yes Yes* 
4.2.  Credential Leakage via Referer Headers Yes No 
4.3.  Credential Leakage via Browser History Yes No 
4.4.  Mix-Up Attacks Yes Yes* 
4.5.  Authorization Code Injection Yes No 
4.6.  Access Token Injection Yes No 
4.7.  Cross Site Request Forgery Yes No 
4.8.  Access Token Leakage at the Resource Server Yes Yes 
4.9.  Open Redirection Yes No 
4.10.  307 Redirect Yes No 
4.11.  TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies Yes Yes 
4.12.  Refresh Token Protection Yes Yes 
4.13.  Client Impersonating Resource Owner Yes Yes 
4.14.  Clickjacking Yes No 
 360 
The Insufficient Redirect URI Validation attack, as described in [13], is conducted as 361 
follows. First, the attacker needs to trick the user into opening a tampered URL in his 362 
browser that launches a page under the attacker's control. This URL initiates an authori- 363 
zation request with the client ID of a legitimate client to the authorization endpoint in- 364 
cluding a redirect URL under the attacker’s control and matching the registered redirect 365 
URL pattern for the legitimate client. The authorization request is processed and pre- 366 
sented to the user. If the user does not see the redirect URI or does not recognize the attack, 367 
the code is issued and immediately sent to the attacker's domain. When using method A, 368 
 
 
the MitM only needs to tamper with any legitimate authorization link sent by the client, 369 
so that the redirect_uri points to a domain under his control. In this case, it would be 370 
difficult for the user to notice that he is being attacked, given that starting the authoriza- 371 
tion by opening the link is part of the legitimate authorization using method A. On the 372 
other hand, when using method B, the attacker’s best attempt would be to trick the user 373 
into believing that a client under his control is actually a legitimate client (e.g. initiating a 374 
new conversation with the user and stating that it is a known client application whose 375 
phone number has changed recently) and to obtain the user’s consent to access his pro- 376 
tected resources. Independently of the method used, this could be shortcut by strictly val- 377 
idating redirect_uris (i.e. performing strict string matching instead of supporting regular 378 
expressions) at authorization server.  379 
Mix-Up attacks require the client to try to obtain authorization from the user using 380 
an authorization server under the attacker’s control. When using method A, the MitM can 381 
simply modify the user messages to trick the client into thinking that the user has selected 382 
the authorization server under the attacker’s control, when he actually has not. On the 383 
other hand, when using method B, this attack would only be possible if the user intention- 384 
ally selects the authorization server under the attacker’s control for any reason. This attack 385 
could be prevented by the client using distinct redirect URIs for each authorization serv- 386 
er. 387 
Finally, there is the passive MitM attack, where the MitM is placed between the client 388 
and the user without modifying any message with the sole purpose of eavesdropping on 389 
the user’s private information exchanged from his routine use of the client. When using 390 
method A, this kind of attack can be prevented by completing the authentication cere- 391 
mony between each user and each client. However, as already stated, the authorization 392 
server, which is responsible for the security of the user’s resources, has no way of being 393 
sure that this authentication ceremony has been performed before issuing an access token. 394 
Method B prevents this attack as explained in Section 4.1. 395 
5. Usability study 396 
We have conducted a study to better understand how users perceive the proposed 397 
authorization method and what might make them reluctant to use it. This study consists 398 
of two tests, test A and test B. In both tests the subject is required to interact with a virtual 399 
assistant, Alfred, using the Signal secure messaging application [14]. At a certain point of 400 
the conversation, Alfred informs the user that he needs his authorization to access some 401 
protected resource on his behalf. In test A subjects are requested to complete the authori- 402 
zation process using the standard authorization code grant type through a web-browser, 403 
as suggested in Section 2.3 (see Fig. 5a). In test B they are requested to authorize Alfred 404 
using the new grant type proposed in Section 3 (see Fig. 5b). After completing both tests, 405 
subjects are required to fill in a small questionnaire including some demographic infor- 406 






Figure 5. (a) Example interaction in test A; (b) Example interaction in test B. 409 
 410 
5.1. Study recruitment, design and realization 411 
The study participants were recruited from our campus and from our circle of ac- 412 
quaintances in equal parts. We ensured that none of them previously knew what our work 413 
consists of or the objective of the study, to avoid biased results.  414 
We designed the study so that each subject would be provided with two similar 415 
smartphones (one for each test) with a preregistered virtual assistant contact. The reason 416 
behind using different smartphones for each test was that it eases the subjects’ under- 417 
standing of what they are doing (authorizing the virtual assistant by two different means), 418 
as we saw during the study design, providing a more reliable feedback. 419 
When the participants arrived, they were firstly asked to read and sign the informed 420 
consent. After that, we briefly explained the basis of the study and informed them that a 421 
study coordinator would be observing their interaction and would answer any possible 422 
question they might have. At this point, the study coordinator handed out the smartphone 423 
prepared for test A and provided the following context information: 424 
Suppose that you are using the Signal app to normally interact with your virtual assistant, 425 
Alfred. You ask him when the following appointment with the physician is. The objective is to 426 
complete the required steps to obtain this information from Alfred. 427 
After successfully completing the first test, the subject was provided with the other 428 
smartphone (prepared for test B) and instructed to repeat the task, after being warned that 429 
some steps in the process would be different. After completing the task, the subject was 430 
required to briefly explain to the study coordinator what he/she had done to check the 431 
subject’s understanding of the technology (up to a certain point). The subject was then 432 
required to complete a small summary containing some demographic questions and some 433 
related with their impressions of both tests. The demographic questions include the sub- 434 
ject’s gender and age. The subjects also had to select one of three options describing their 435 
degree of familiarity with the technology. The three levels were “Occasional user”, “Ha- 436 
bitual user” and “Advanced user”, defined as follows: 437 
• Occasional user: your main use of computers is to occasionally navigate the 438 
web, send/read emails or see some videos on YouTube. 439 
 
 
• Habitual user: you usually rely on a computer for many tasks daily and/or part 440 
of your work depends on it as a user. 441 
• Advanced user: you are a computer enthusiast and/or your work involves a 442 
deep level of computer understanding (programmer, computer sciences, etc.). 443 
For each test, the question “What has been your impression on the usability of 444 
method X?” was asked to rate the usability of the authorization method. Possible answers 445 
to this question were integers from 1 to 10, where the higher score was the better. The 446 
question “Do you believe the method X to be secure? Why?” was also included for each 447 
test, where possible answers were “yes” and “no” along with a space to justify their an- 448 
swer. Finally, the participants were requested to answer the question “Which method 449 
would you prefer to use?” considering their overall experience and taking into account 450 
both usability and security. A text box was also required to be filled in including some 451 
“Specific comments that motivate your previous responses”. After completing the ques- 452 
tionnaire, the study coordinator announced that the study had finished. 453 
5.2. Demographics 454 
A total of 24 participants took part in the study. One of them was a priori excluded 455 
from the study given that he affirmed that he did not understand what he had done after 456 
completing the test. The remaining 23 participants were categorized in accordance with 457 
three parameters, their gender, their age and their degree of experience of interacting with 458 
computers. 10 participants out of the 23 were male (43% of the total). The participants 459 
were categorized in three age groups: under 25, between 25 and 48, and 49 and over. The 460 
first group had 8 participants (35% of the total), the second group 10 (43%) and the last 461 
group 5 (22%). The level of familiarity with computers was categorized in the three levels 462 
defined in Section 5.1: “Occasional user”, “Habitual user” and “Advanced user”. The first 463 
group had 10 participants (43%), the second group 4 (17%) while the last group had 9 (39 464 
%). All this information is summarized in Table 2. 465 
Table 2. Participants' demographics. 466 
Individual characteristics N % 
Gender   
    Male 10 43 
    Female 13 57 
Age   
    0-24 8 35 
    25-48 10 43 
    49+ 5 22 
Tech. Level   
    Occasional user 10 43 
    Habitual user 4 17 
    Advanced user 9 39 
 467 
We can see that the population is reasonably well-balanced as regards the gender of 468 
the participants. Looking at their ages, the younger and mid-range groups are also well 469 
balanced while the oldest subjects’ group has less members than the others. Finally, the 470 
participants experience with the use of computers is skewed since only a few are habitual 471 
users. This is due to the recruitment procedure. Most of the participants from our circle of 472 
acquaintances are occasional users, while participants from our campus are advanced us- 473 
ers. However, the occasional users and advanced users’ groups are well balanced. 474 
6. Results and discussion 475 
In this section we present the results obtained from the usability study both qualita- 476 
tively and quantitatively. The participants’ responses to the questionnaire are 477 
 
 
summarized in Table 3. The first row in the table includes the mean number of points with 478 
which participants rated the usability of both methods out of a maximum of 10. The sec- 479 
ond row shows the number of participants who believe each method to be secure while 480 
the last row shows how many participants preferred one method over the other. 481 
Table 3. Usability study overall results. 482 
Question Test A Test B 
Usability 7.74 8.52 
Security 13 23 
Pref. method 4 19 
 483 
There is no significant difference between the usability rates obtained by both meth- 484 
ods. As many participants stated, “both methods are very simple to use”. However, the 485 
method proposed in this work obtained a slightly better result. In Table 4 we can observe 486 
participants comments that justify this. From the usability point-of-view, most partici- 487 
pants who preferred method B said that it is simpler because they do not have to leave the 488 
application to complete the process (15 participants). A smaller set of participants stated 489 
that they prefer method A since the interaction is more similar to that which they currently 490 
use for authorization tasks (just 3 participants). From the security perspective, 13 out of 491 
the 23 participants believed the method used in test A to be secure. Many participants (16 492 
out of 23) expressed their concern that they do not feel comfortable clicking the link pro- 493 
vided by the client. However, some of them (6) still considered this method to be secure. 494 
On the other hand, all the participants involved in the study believe the method used in 495 
test B to be secure. Just one participant pointed out that he obtained a better security im- 496 
pression with the method for the test A stating that “seeing the link makes me more com- 497 
fortable as I get a deeper understanding about how the system works”. The conjunction 498 
of all these facts explains that most participants (19 out of 23) prefer to use the method 499 
proposed in this work. 500 
Table 4. Participants' commentaries. 501 
Participant comments # 
Test A  
    It is more familiar 3 
    The interaction is simpler 2 
    Seeing the link gives me more security 1 
Test B  
    The interaction is simpler 6 
    It is more secure 14 
    Do not have to leave the app  15 
    I do not feel comfortable clicking a link 16 
 502 
Figure 6 details the results showing differences between the population groups de- 503 
scribed in Section 5.2. Figure 6a shows results distributed by gender, Figure 6b shows their 504 
distribution by ages while Figure 6c does the same with the level of familiarity with the 505 
technology. In all the subfigures, the bars are grouped in three categories: the usability 506 
rate, security and the preferred method. The first group of bars represents the usability 507 
rate assigned to each test (over a maximum of 100 points), the second group shows the 508 
percentage of participants that believe the method to be secure while the third group 509 
shows the participants’ preferences of one method over the other. The bars for the same 510 
demographic group share the same color between categories, while the solid bars repre- 511 





Figure 6. Usability study detailed results. 515 
Figure 6a shows no significant differences in how participants of different genders 516 
rated the usability, although male participants believe method A to be more secure than 517 
female participants, which is also reflected in the preferred method for each of them. Fig- 518 
ure 6b, which shows the results split by the age of the participants, indicates that there are 519 
no significant differences among users in the 18 to 24 age group and users in the 25 to 48 520 
age group in any of the three categories. However, older participants (49 and over) rated 521 
the usability of method A as being worse than method B and had less confidence in the 522 
security of method A. This is reflected in the fact that no user in this group preferred 523 
method A over method B. 524 
The most interesting results can be seen in figure 6c, which shows the results depend- 525 
ing on the technical abilities of the participants. In this figure, occasional users are labeled 526 
as tech. 1, habitual users as tech. 2 and advanced users as tech. 3. The more experienced 527 
participants rated the usability of method A higher than others with less experience. A 528 
larger number of experienced participants also trusted method A to be secure compared 529 
with participants in other groups. Finally, all the participant that preferred method A over 530 
method B were advanced users. Some insights derived by this study may be conditioned 531 
 
 
by the limited number of participants and a study addressing this concern would be 532 
needed to confirm our findings.  533 
As a final comment, none of the participants involved in the study noticed that the 534 
link sent by the client points to a HTTP service (see Fig. 5a), which is not using TLS to 535 
secure the connection (i.e. using HTTPS instead). In a real scenario this link might be sent 536 
by a MitM (trying to cheat the user) if the authentication ceremony has not been completed 537 
between the user and the client. This demonstrates that most users (including some grad- 538 
uates in computer sciences) are far from understanding all the security implications of 539 
their decisions and actions. Thus, security methods should be designed to protect users’ 540 
security on their behalf, reducing their exposure to possible threats derived from their 541 
actions.  542 
In this context, minimizing the number of required authentication ceremonies would 543 
improve not only the system usability but also the security of the communication. Using 544 
the flow proposed in this work with the OpenID Connect [15] protocol to provide feder- 545 
ated identity would help with this problem. In the OpenID Connect protocol, the client 546 
application wants to obtain some information about the end-user (such as their identity) 547 
from an identity provider. One of the OAuth grant types is used to allow the identity 548 
provider to authenticate the user and obtain their consent to share the information with 549 
the client. A client application that uses the OpenID Connect protocol with the proposed 550 
grant type to deal with users’ identities would not need to worry about the presence of a 551 
possible MitM attacker even without completing the authentication ceremony. In this 552 
case, the identity provider would seamlessly verify that the public key fingerprint in- 553 
cluded in the authorization request really belongs to the user (just in the same way that 554 
an authorization server does as part of a normal authorization flow) ensuring that no 555 
MitM risk exists. Thus, the user is only required to complete the authentication ceremony 556 
with the identity provider instead of doing so with each client. 557 
In the same way, an authorization server may rely on an identity provider to deal 558 
with a user’s identity. In such a situation the authorization server would act as the client 559 
of the identity provider, so that only the authentication ceremony with the identity pro- 560 
vider would newly be required. This is especially interesting for those scenarios where 561 
users’ resources are spread across several resource servers protected by different author- 562 
ization servers. 563 
7. Conclusions 564 
In this work we propose a new protocol to allow users to authorize third-party ap- 565 
plications when the interaction with these applications is taking place through a messag- 566 
ing application. This protocol has been designed as a new OAuth grant type to take ad- 567 
vantage of all the elements already defined in this framework, and to provide direct access 568 
to all existent APIs which are already secured using it. The proposed grant type allows 569 
the authorization server to interact with the resource owner directly through the same 570 
messaging platform already being used for interaction with the client. It also allows the 571 
authorization server to be sure that there is no risk of an MitM between the client and the 572 
user before issuing an access token.  573 
Aligning the way that authentication and authorization tasks are handled with how 574 
users interact to obtain the service that requires these tasks improves the overall system 575 
usability. In the usability test, we have seen that most users found the proposed method 576 
usable for authorizing clients through messaging platforms and preferred it to using a 577 
web-browser with this same purpose. This is especially true for those users less experi- 578 
enced with computers, who rated our proposed approach highly for both usability and 579 
security. This is very important since users with less technical skills are the main target of 580 
the new service delivery paradigm aiming to reach more population sectors. 581 
The use of new features included in some messaging application (like Telegram’s 582 
embedded web-browser) may affect the usability test results, as they make the authoriza- 583 
tion process smoother without forcing the user to swap between the messaging platform 584 
 
 
and the system web-browser. However, some major messaging applications (i.e. Signal, 585 
WhatsApp, etc.) do not support this feature yet and the problem with the MitM attacker 586 
would always remain there even with the use of embedded browsers. 587 
Finally, the proposed method widely reduces the number of authentication ceremo- 588 
nies that must be completed. However, one authentication ceremony (with the authoriza- 589 
tion server) is still required. Further research may explore the inclusion of digital certifi- 590 
cates to stop relying on the completion of any authentication ceremony. On the other 591 
hand, some insights derived from the usability study may be conditioned by the limited 592 
number of participants (a total of 23) and a study addressing this concern would be 593 
needed to confirm our findings. 594 
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